Abstract. Fienberg convincingly demonstrates that Bayesian models and methods represent a powerful approach to squeezing illumination from data in public policy settings. However, no school of inference is without its weaknesses, and, in the face of the ambiguities, uncertainties, and poorly posed questions of the real world, perhaps we should not expect to find a formally correct inferential strategy which can be universally applied, whatever the nature of the question: we should not expect to be able to identify a "norm" approach. An analogy is made between George Box's "no models are right, but some are useful," and inferential systems.
Professor Fienberg has compiled an impressive collection of examples illustrating the power of the Bayesian approach in public policy and government applications. However, while these are compelling illustrations of this power, I am uneasy about using them as the basis for an assertion that this single approach should be adopted as the "norm" (which I take to mean "should be adopted as the standard practice"). Does it not mean, instead, that Bayesian approaches are valuable tools to be included in the armory of every statistician working in public policy and government settings, so that the statistician is better able to pick an approach, method, or class of methods which will shed most light on the problem he or she is tackling? That is, rather than arguing for a "norm" method of inference, should we not accept that it is unrealistic to hope to find such a single norm, and instead accept that different approaches are suited to different situations and questions? To follow the comment in Bayarri and Berger (2004) , should we not recognize that "statisticians should readily use both Bayesian and frequentist ideas" and "that each approach has a great deal to contribute to statistical practice"? In fact, going even further than this, perhaps it is brave to assert that a unique formal system, with clear and precise definitions and methods, is adequate to provide an inferential mapping from the real world, with all its uncertainties, ambiguities, inadequate definitions, and poorly posed problems. Fienberg himself has elsewhere remarked that "the bottom line for me involves drawing upon a mix of pragmatism and principle" (Fienberg, 2006) . We recognize that our statistical models are only models, and that none are "right" (as George Box told us), so why should we believe that any particular inferential strategy is "right," in the sense that it should be adopted as the norm?
This point is perhaps reinforced by Fienberg's introductory critique of the Bayesian perspective, in which he notes that the most common criticism "is that, since there is no single correct prior distribution, g(θ), all conclusions drawn from the posterior distribution are suspect." He says that responses to this criticism include the recommendation that one should "consider and report the results associated with a variety of prior distributions" and "that one should choose as a prior distribution one that in some sense eliminates personal subjectivity." He does not argue that these remove the difficulty, but he does go on to say that "one characteristic of the Bayesian argument that weakens this criticism. . . is that the more data we collect, the less influence the prior distribution has on the posterior relative to that of the data." This justification seems to be equivalent to saying that, while there may be a fundamental theoretical difficulty with Bayesian inference, this may not matter in practice. That would mean that while it was fine as a practical inferential tool, it also could not be regarded as a formally "correct" approach to inference-it would be (and indeed is) just an approximation to the complexities of building an adequate model for inference in the real world. After all, contrary to what is occasionally glibly asserted, Bayesian methods do not provide a solution to the problem of inductive inference: a Bayesian analysis does not answer the question "what should I believe?" All Bayesian methods do is provide a rational (coherent, consistent) way to update beliefs, to change one's beliefs in the light of evidence. This is implicit in Fienberg's comment that "Bayesian methodology. . . provides an internally consistent and coherent normative methodology." But the internal consistency says nothing about inference beyond the formal system involved; to do this we do need to include the prior.
In contrast to the consistency and coherence of Bayesian methodology, Fienberg says "frequentist methodology has no such consistent normative framework." Perhaps, but on the other hand, as Cox [(2006) , page 197] succinctly puts it: "Frequentist analyses are based on a simple and powerful unifying principle. The implications of data are examined using measuring techniques such as confidence limits and significance tests calibrated, as are other measuring instruments, indirectly by the hypothetical consequences of their repeated use. In particular, they use the notion that consistency in a certain respect of the data with a specified value of the parameter of interest can be assessed via a p-value." That is, we draw conclusions using a system which, provided it is used properly, and subject to any assumptions it makes, will be right most of the timeand "being right most of the time" is surely a good justification for using this approach.
Fienberg's Section 2, in which the criticisms of Bayesian methods quoted above are given, is entitled "The arguments for and against the use of Bayesian methods." He manages to resist rehearsing the many criticisms of frequentist approaches, possibly because they would have made a paper in their own right, but presumably they might also have been marshalled as arguments for Bayesian methods (on the principle that "my enemy's enemy is my friend"). But he could have listed many other criticisms of the Bayesian school, such as the Dutch book problem, the problem of learning over time (coherence arguments refer to a static situation), the interpretation of a probability 1/2 as meaning the same thing whether based on a million coin tosses or subjective opinion, multiparameter issues, as well as others. These and other matters have been long fought over, and while many will doubtless have been resolved to the satisfaction of at least some people, their mere presence suggests that there are more questions about the Bayesian strategy than is sometimes recognized. That is, it suggests that this is merely an approach to approximating the complexity of inference for the natural world.
Fienberg draws attention to the incorrect notion that frequentist methods are "objective," and also notes that pragmatic Bayesian methods "have many subjective elements." Inference is an attempt to draw some conclusion about the real world, and I agree that it would be naive to suppose that that can be done without subjective aspects. Since statistical inference has the prerequisite of a mapping from the world to the formal system within which the inference is to be conducted, it is difficult to see how that could be done without some subjective element or arbitrary choices. I would argue that the most important aspects of any statistical analysis are deciding what the scientific question is, and then making an effective (or at least adequate) mapping to a statistical question (e.g., Hand, 1994 Hand, , 1996 . Moreover, since such mappings always lead to formal representations which are, at best, only approximations to the (perhaps even typically rather ill-posed) scientific question, too much emphasis on the niceties of the formal statistical inferential method may be unnecessary. In my view, far too little attention is devoted, in both statistical education and practice, to the key issue of establishing the mapping-before the formal inferential tools can be applied.
Perhaps the most impressive thing about Fienberg's choice of examples is their scope, both in terms of application areas and in terms of the way in which Bayesian methodology is applied. I will make a few comments on the examples below, but it would be naive to expect me to be able to fault the analyses, on two counts. First, the examples were presumably chosen as exemplars of the effectiveness of such methodology in such applications, and this is obviously best done by choosing examples where the methodology is indeed effective. And second, the sensitive and sophisticated use of any statistical school (in this case a particular one) by someone who really knows what he or she is doing is likely to lead to effective results. By "know what he or she is doing," I mean balancing pragmatism and principles, as noted above. This includes the ability to choose a model form which captures the essence of the problem, rather than either simply trying to model every aspect of the underlying system or failing to include some vital aspect. The first of these failures would risk rejecting a model which could be perfectly adequate for the purpose at hand, even though it failed to match the data in other ways, and the second would mean the model was not fit for the purpose. This is all part of the art of statistics.
I think, therefore, that the impressiveness of the examples does not establish that this approach should be adopted as the "norm," but rather that such an approach is highly effective (for these kinds of problems), when used by someone who knows what he or she is doing.
Several of the examples (small area estimation and census adjustment, election night forecasting, post-marketing surveillance of drugs) hinge on the notion of "borrowing strength." This is a powerful tool, built on so-called empirical Bayes, which really represents something of a Bayesian frequentist synthesis. I am sure we will see such methods used more and more often as electronic data capture facilitates the easy compilation of massive data sets, permitting exploration of finer and finer partitions. Continuing debates about national censuses (e.g., Canada's abandonment of the long-form census) mean that such sophisticated tools are likely to have an important public policy role in the future. Likewise, the growing use of league tables and other systems for ranking and rating hospitals (even individual surgeons), schools, local authorities, police forces, and other public bodies are areas where such adjustments can be very valuable. At a more refined level, the problem of detecting adverse drug reactions in post-marketing surveillance of drugs is an example of a type of problem which produces a very large number of cells arranged in a crossclassification-and, naturally, often relatively small cell counts. Overcoming this by borrowing strength requires some way of determining the "similarity" between cells. This might be done in various waysassuming independence between the factors of the cross-classification, using external information characterizing the objects, or based on measures of similarities between the row and column count profiles (e.g., Zhang, 2007) .
Other examples, however, cover quite different kinds of application of Bayesian methods-and so reveal the strengths of Bayesian approaches in quite different ways. One such area which is relatively new is that of adaptive clinical trials. If borrowing strength has a natural Bayesian interpretation, so too does adaptive allocation of patients, as one's state of knowledge changes.
Statistics might be defined as the science of uncertainty, so Fienberg's example of climate change is very fitting-and perhaps this is an example which does very naturally fall into a Bayesian mold. The UK's Royal Society has recently produced a summary of the current scientific evidence on climate change and its drivers, which spells out "where the science is well established, where there is wide consensus but continuing debate, and where there remains substantial uncertainty" (Royal Society, 2010) .
One of the recognized strengths of Bayesian methods is that they can extract information from small samples (albeit at the cost of using "information" from other sources), but that does not mean they are restricted to small samples; indeed the potential to produce cross-classifications of large samples, noted above, means that the demand for Bayesian tools can be just as great with large samples. Fienberg does not explicitly use the phrase "data mining" (though it appears twice in his references). However, his final paragraph draws attention to the use of latent variable models with very large data sets. More generally, data mining has made extensive use of hidden Markov models, and has adopted various other Bayesian modeling approaches, such as the use of graphical models ("Bayesian belief networks") in health surveillance. Having said that, I think it is true that most work which is explicitly labeled as data mining still has a tendency to be focused on algorithms rather than inference. The large sample inferential work seems to be being carried out by statisticians (e.g., Efron, 2010) .
In summary, I think Fienberg goes too far in suggesting that Bayesian methods should become the "norm" in public settings. Rather, I think we should accept that no inferential system will always be appropriate, therefore being adopted as a norm or standard approach. Instead we should acknowledge that different systems are different strategies for tackling a problem which defies a "correct" solution; that we should therefore retain our flexibility, and match our system to our objective, just as different models are suited to answering different questions. However, the examples Fienberg has chosen certainly illustrate the power of the Bayesian perspective in public policy applications. The examples also illustrate how advances in statistics are driven by practical applications, and the historical backgrounds to the examples also show rather beautifully how statistical ideas develop over time. I thoroughly enjoyed the paper.
